The Use of Reference Objective Levels in Group Assessment of Solutions of Mulltiobjective Optimization by Wierzbicki, A.P.
The Use of Reference Objective 
Levels in Group Assessment of 






Wierzbicki, A.P. (1979) The Use of Reference Objective Levels in Group Assessment of Solutions of Mulltiobjective 
Optimization. IIASA Working Paper. WP-79-124 Copyright © 1979 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/1059/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF THE AUTHOR 
THE USE OF REFERENCE OBJECTIVE LEVELS 
IN GROUP ASSESSMENT OF SOLUTIONS 




Working Papers are intorim reports on work of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
and have received only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily repre- 
sent those of the Institute or of its National Member 
Organizations. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 

SUMMARY 
Many papers devoted to problems of group assessment of 
Pareto-optlmal solutions or of compromise reaching in cooper- 
ative games were based on notions of utility functions or 
preference ordering identification. However, there is strong 
evidence that individual decision makers are apt to think in 
terms of goals or desirable levels of objectives rather than 
in terms of utility and preferences. Since reference objec- 
tive levels can be used instead of weighting coefficients and 
utility functions to derive basic conditions for Pareto-opti- 
mality, they can also be applied to construct compromise-aiding 
procedures for cooperative games or for group assessment of 
Pareto-optimal solutions. 
Several variants of such compromise-aiding procedures are 
investigated in the paper, together with deadlock situations 
and deadlock-resolving procedures. 

THE USE OF REFERENCE OBJECTIVE LEVELS 
I N  GROUP ASSESSMENT OF SOLUTIONS 
OF MULTIOBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION 
A . P .  Wierzb i ck i  
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
Bas i c  t h e o r y  o f  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  h a s  been 
developed i n  a  s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n  t o  economic t h e o r y .  S t a r t i n g  
from t h e  work o f  P a r e t o  [17] th rough  market  t h e o r y  and g e n e r a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  t h e o r y ,  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  h a s  been a l -  
ways r e l a t e d  t o  we igh t i ng  c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g s  
and u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  -- see, f o r  example, Debreu 1959, [ 3 ] .  
Most o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  on m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  and d e c i s i o n  
t h e o r y  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e s e  b a s i c  n o t i o n s .  
While a  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  d e s c r i b e s  w e l l  a n  average  behav io r  
of  an a g e n t  i n  an  economic p roce s s ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  do n o t  t h i n k  i n  
terms o f  t h e i r  u t i l i t y  p r e f e r e n c e s  when t h e y  make d e c i s i o n s .  
I n  f a c t ,  expe r imen t a l  a t t e m p t s  t o  i d e n t i f y  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  
f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  o f t e n  show d i s c r e p a n c i e s  between t h e o r y  and 
expe r imen t a l  r e s u l t s  -- see, f o r  example, t h e  pape r  o f  Tversky 
i n  B e l l ,  Keeney and R a i f f a  1977, [ I ] .  Moreover, p rocedures  and 
q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t e d  t o  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  a r e  l e n g t h y  
and time-consuming. I n d i v i d u a l  d e c i s i o n  makers a r e  seldom s u f -  
f i c i e n t l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e i r  own u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  t o  t a k e  p a r t  
i n  such exper iments ;  t h e y  a r e  r a t h e r  used t o  t h i n k  i n  t e r m s  o f  
g o a l s  and d e s i r a b l e  l e v e l s  o f  v a r i o u s  o b j e c t i v e s  when making 
everyday d e c i s i o n s .  
T h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n  m o t i v a t e d  s e v e r a l  r e s e a r c h e r s  on m u l t i -  
o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  and d e c i s i o n  making. Dyer 1972 [ 4 1 ,  
Kornbluth  1973 [ I l l  u sed  a t t a i n a b l e  l e v e l s  o f  o b j e c t i v e  func-  
t i o n s  f o r  an  approach t o  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  c a l l e d  
g o a l  programming. Sakluvadze  1971 [ 1 9 ] ,  1974 [ 2 0 ] ,  Yu and 
Leitmann 1974 [261 u s e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  f a r  u n a t t a i n a b l e  l e v e l s  
o f  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  f o r  u t o p i a  p o i n t  programming. W i e r z b i c k i  
1975 - 1979 [21 ,22 ,24,251 h a s  shown t h a t  any r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t  i n  
o b j e c t i v e  s p a c e  -- a t t a i n a b l e  o r  n o t ,  u t o p i a - p o i n t  t y p e  o r  n o t - -  
can b e  used t o  c o n s i s t e n t l y  s c a l a r i z e  a  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  problem 
v i a  s o c a l l e d  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n s ,  which combine and 
r e f i n e  t h e  approaches  o f  g o a l  programming and u t o p i a  p o i n t  pro-  
gramming. Moreover,  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  l e v e l s  and p e n a l t y  
s c a l a r i z a t i o n  can  be  used  i n s t e a d  o f  w e i g h t i n g  c o e f f i c i e n t s  and 
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  t o  d e r i v e  a  f u l l  se t  of  b a s i c  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
P a r e t o - o p t i m a l i t y .  They can a l s o  be a p p l i e d  t o  c o n s t r u c t  f a s t  
i n t e r a c t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  making, f o r  
dynamic m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n ,  etc.  A l l  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  
have  been o b t a i n e d  e a r l i e r  [ 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 4 , 2 5 ] ,  and o n l y  a  s h o r t  
summary of  them i s  p r e s e n t e d  h e r e .  T h i s  p a p e r  i s  devo ted  t o  
a  s t u d y  o f  g roup  d e c i s i o n  making p rocedures  where i n d i v i d u a l  
d e c i s i o n  makers have p a r t l y  c o n f l i c t i n g  g o a l s  and t h e  b a r g a i n -  
i n g  between them p r o c e e d s  i n  t e r m s  of  d e s i r a b l e  o b j e c t i v e  l e v e l s .  
2 .  REVIEW OF PROPERTIES OF PENALTY SCALARIZING FUNCTIONS 
Consider  a  s i m p l e  c a s e  of  a  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  
problem, where s e v e r a l  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  ( f  ( x )  , . . . , f n  ( x )  ) = f  ( x )  
a r e  a l l  t o  b e  minimized i n  t h e  P a r e t o  s e n s e .  L e t  x € X O  be  c a l l e d  
a d m i s s i b l e  d e c i s i o n s  and q  = f ( x )  € Q O  = f ( x o )  b e  c a l l e d  o b j e c -  
t i v e s .  The se t  Q O  c R" i s  t h e  set  o f  a t t a i n a b l e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and 
i t s  p o i n t s  6 eBO such  t h a t  (6 - g:) n Q o  = g a r e  P a r e t o - o p t i m a l  
-n 
' 0 1 .  o b j e c t i v e s ,  where R+ = { ~ E R "  : q # O , q l  LOfq2,O1 . . . , q n -  
I t  i s  known -- see, f o r  example,  [3 ]  -- t h a t  Pa re to -op t ima l  ob- 
j e c t i v e s  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  minimal  p o i n t s  o v e r  Q o f  any s t r i c t l y  
1  0  
o r d e r - p r e s e r v i n g  f u n c t i o n  s : Qo + R , t h a t  i s ,  o f -  a  f u n c t i o n  s 
2 1 -n  2  1 
such  t h a t  q  - q  E  FI+ i m p l i e s  s ( q  ) > s ( q  ) . O r d e r - p r e s e r v i n g  
p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  b a s i c  r equ i r emen t s  f o r  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s ;  t h e  
s i m p l e s t  s t r i c t l y  o rde r -p r e se rv ing  f u n c t i o n  i s  t h e  l i n e a r  func-  
n  On n  t i o n  s ( q )  = iCl  Aiqi, where ( A l , .  . . , A n )  = A E R  = {AER :A > O f . .  . ,An>O} + 1 
i s  a  v e c t o r  o f  we igh t i ng  c o e f f i c i e n t s .  However, t h e  u s e  o f  
we igh t ing  c o e f f i c i e n t s  i n  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  h a s  known 
drawbacks. 
I f  any r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  p o i n t  ~ E R "  i s  g i v e n ,  t h e n  a  
t y p i c a l  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  ha s  t h e  form: 
- 
- 2  
s ( q  - q )  =, -llq - qll + pH (q  - :)+I1 2  
- - 
where ( q - q ) +  deno t e s  t h e  v e c t o r  w i t h  components m a x ( O , q i - q i ) ,  
and p i s  a  s c a l a r  p e n a l t y  c o e f f i c i e n t .  Many o t h e r  forms o f  
s i m i l a r  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n s ,  w i t h  analogous  p r o p e r t i e s ,  
have been s p e c i f i e d  i n  [ 22 ,24 ] .  
The p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  ( 1 )  h a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
b a s i c  p r o p e r t i e s :  
A. For any ~ E R "  and any p > 1 ,  t h e  f u n c t i o n  ( 1 )  i s  s t r i c t l y  
o r d e r - p r e s e r v i n g  i n  q ,  i f  an  Euc l i dean  norm o r  a  sum o f  a b s o l u t e  
v a l u e s  norm i s  used ,  and o r d e r - p r e s e r v i n g  i n  q ,  i f  t h e  maximum 
norm i s  used.  Thus, f o r  t h e  P a r e t o - o p t i m a l i t y  of  some B E X ~  
- 
and e = f  (2) it i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t h a t  2 = a r g  min s ( f  ( x )  - q ) ,  
- xEX0 6 = a r g  min s ( q  - q )  . 
qEQo 
- 
B. I f  $ = a r g  min s ( q  - q )  and 6 f q,  t h e n  t h e  (normal ized)  
9EQn A 
w eigh t i ng  c o e f f i c i e n t V s  A cor responding  t o  t h e  p o i n t  can  be  
a posteriori de te rmined  by 
C .  I f  q  i s  an E-Pare to -op t imal  o b j e c t i v e  ( t h a t  i s ,  a l l  
A 
normal ized we igh t i ng  c o e f f i c i e n t s  cor respond  t o  6 a r e  g r e a t e r  i 
t h a n  E and P > max ( 1  , E - ~ ) ,  t h e n  
h 
min s ( q - q )  = 0  . 
In other words, the following property holds for any E Rn 
and p > max(l,~-~): 
n n 
where RE+ = { ~ E R "  :dist(q,R+) - < ~ 1 1 ~ 1 1 } .  The property (4) of the 
- 
level set So of s(q-q) is called an order-approximation property; 
its importance is explained in Figure 1 in terms of supporting 
the set QO at as necessary condition of Pareto-optimality. 
Figure 1. Supporting the set do as necessary condition of Pareto- 
optimality: a)general case, by the level set So of the 
penalty scalarizing function; b)convex case, b ~ t h e  level 
set So of theAlinear combination with weighting 
coefficients A. 
Another useful property of penalty scalarizing functions of 
the type (1) is the following: 
n D. If <@ao + R +  and the Pareto-set Go is compact, then 
= arg min s(q - q )  is also the closest point in Go to <, 
q a o  
6 = arg mi? llq - < l l .  
W Q o  
The following condition of the existence of Pareto-optimal 
objectives is also related to the penalty scalarizing function (1): 
n E .  If there exists a q E Q~ such that the set Qo n (4 - R+) is 
nonempty and compact, 'then there exist Pareto-optimal objectives 
Q in this set. 
I t  sh o u l d  be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  Pare to -op t imal  p o i n t  4, 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  a  g i v e n  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  p o i n t  q o b t a i n e d  
v i a  m i n i m i za t i o n  o f  s ( q - q ) ,  depends n o t  o n l y  on q b u t  a l s o  on 
t h e  c h o i c e  of  t h e  norm, t h e  s c a l e s  o r  r anges  f o r  s e p a r a t e  ob- 
j e c t i v e s ,  and on t h e  p e n a l t y  c o e f f i c i e n t  p .  However, t h e  s c a l i n g  
of  s e p a r a t e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h e  c h o i c e  of  t h e  norm and p e n a l t y  co- 
e f f i c i e n t  p l a y  a  r a t h e r  t e c h n i c a l  r o l e :  t h e  Pare to -op t imal  p o i n t  
6 depends p r i m a r i l y  on q. By changing 6, t h e  cor responding  4 
P. 
c a n  be moved t o  any p o i n t  of  t h e  P a r e t o - s e t  Q o ,  whatever  c h o i c e  
o f  s c a l i n g ,  norm, and p e n a l t y  c o e f f i c i e n t  h a s  been made. 
T h e r e f o r e ,  it i s  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  p o i n t  q t h a t  t a k e s  
and ,  i n  a  s e n s e ,  g e n e r a l i z e s  t h e  r o l e  of  we igh t i ng  c o e f f i c i e n t s  
X i n  fundamenta l  t h e o r y  o f  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n .  The 
p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n ,  i n  a  s e n s e ,  t a k e s  and g e n e r a l i z e s  
t h e  r o l e  o f  a u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  I t  s a t i s f i e s  less a x i o m a t i c  
r e q u i r em en t s  t h a n  a  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  b u t  h a s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  some 
s t r o n g e r  p r o p e r t i e s :  b e s i d e s  be ing  o r d e r - p r e s e r v i n g ,  it i s  a l s o  
o rder -approx imat ing ,  which p r o v i d e s  f o r  t h e  g e n e r a l  and e a s i l y  
a p p l i c a b l e  form of  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  P a r e t o - o p t i m a l i t y  
( 3 ) .  However, t h e  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  ( 1 )  i s  n o t  a  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n ,  and i s  n o t  used  t o  f i n d  " t h e  o p t i m a l "  6 o u t  of t h e  
P a r e t o - s e t .  I t s  o n l y  purpose  i s  t o  g e n e r a t e  Pare to -op t imal  6 
which i s  i n  some s e n s e  c l o s e  t o  t h e  g i v e n  q i f  ~ $ Z Q ~ ,  o r  i n  some 
s e n s e  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  l e v e l s  exp re s sed  by q i f  ~ E Q ~ ,  
see e .g .  [211. Th e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  ex- 
p r e s s e s  r a t h e r  a  p r ag m a t i ca l  behav io r  o f  a  d e c i s i o n  maker t h a n  
h i s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  I f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker i s  n o t  s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  t h e  o b t a i n e d  r e s u l t s  4 = f i ; ) ,  he  can  change q and ,  by 
P. 
doing it, v e r y  f a s t  l e a r n s  t o  o b t a i n  any d e s i r a b l e  p o i n t  a E  Qo , 
see [ 2 5 ] .  
3. COMPROl.fISE-AIDING PROCEDURES; THE CASE OF SINGLE OBJECTIVES 
FOR INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS 
Cons ider  a  p a r t l y  c o n f l i c t i n g  s i t u a t i o n  i n  a  p u r e  s t r a t e g y  
game, where s e v e r a l  a g e n t s  o r  d e c i s i o n  makers have s e p a r a t e  ob- 
j e c t i v e s  q l ,  . . . , q n  which t hey  would l i k e  t o  minimize. H e r e  w e  
avoid consciously the description "players" since the stress is 
rather put on compromise reaching than on playing a game. The 
decision makers can make independent decisions xl EXO1 I . - .  ~ x ~ E X ~ ~ ~  
but the decisions influence not only their own objectives: 
q, = fl (xl I "Xn) I " "  qn = fn(xl '...'xn) ( 5 )  
Assume that the decision makers form a committee to agree upon 
a joint decision x = (xl, ..., xn) which would resuJt in an outcome 
q = f(x) in a sense satisfactory to all of them. How can one 
devise pragmatical procedures to help them attaining a compromise 
in their decisions? 
One way of constructing such compromise-aiding procedures 
is to refer to basic economic theory and to aggregate the utility 
functions of the decision makers. Several difficult methodolo- 
gical problems are encauntered when proceeding along this way. 
In this paper, however, it is assumed that the decision makers 
express their goals in terms of objective levels qi, and the 
bargaining takes place in the objective space. It is also as- 
sumed that the committee is aided by an optimization procedure, 
which defines the decision 2 needed to obtain a Pareto-optimal 
outcome 6, in a sense close to the desired objectives. 
The simplest form of the compromise-aiding procedure was 
proposed by Kallio and Lewandowski in ? 9 7 9  [121. It was assumed 
that each decision maker specifies only his own desirable level 
- 
qi and is not necessarily fully informed about other objectives. 
The iterative procedure is as follows (iteration number j): 
-1 -1 Step 1 . Given 5' = (ql , - .  .,qn) , a penalty scalarizing 
function of the type (1) is minimized to obtain a Pareto-optimal 
. 
The decision makers are informed about this feasible outcome 
and the decisions needed to obtain it. 
Step 2. Each decision maker is required to move his ref- 
erence objective level towards ~ i ,  at least B-times the entire 
distance: 
where fl E (O;1] i s  a  p r e s p e c i f i e d  number. I f  t h e y  a l l  a g r e e  t o  
do s o ,  S t e p  1  i s  r e p e a t e d  w i t h  j  + j + l .  I f  a t  l e a s t  one of  them 
does n o t  a g r e e ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  c a l l e d  a  dead lock  and c a l l s  
f o r  s p e c i a l  dead lock-break ing  p r o c e d u r e s .  
The convergence  o f  t h i s  p rocedure ,  i f  no  d e a d l o c k s  o c c u r ,  
i s  s e l f - e v i d e n t :  t h e  d i s t a n c e  between qJ and 6' must  converge 
t o  z e r o ,  and p r a c t i c a l l y  t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers would soon a g r e e  
- j+l  ~j 
on q  = q  . T h i s  i s  shown i n  F i g u r e  2 f o r  t h e  c a s e  o f  t w o  
d e c i s i o n  makers .  
F i g u r e  2 .  I l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s i m p l e s t  compromise-aiding 
p rocedure .  
Another  q u e s t i o n  i s  whether  t h i s  p r o c e d u r e  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
f l e x i b l e ,  t h a t  i s ,  whether  a r b i t r a r y  p o i n t s  of  t h e  P a r e t o - s e t  G o  
a r e  a t t a i n a b l e  by t h i s  p r o c e d u r e ,  p rov ided  t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers 
a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  c o o p e r a t e  i n  a c h i e v i n g  t h i s  p o i n t .  S i n c e  t h e  
-0 -0 -0 
s t a r t i n g  o b j e c t i v e  l e v e l s  q  = ( q l ,  . . . , q  ,) a r e  a r b i t r a r y ,  t h e r e  
i s  no doub t  a b o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  r e a c h i n g  a n  a r b i t r a r y  P a r e t o -  
o p t i m a l  p o i n t .  But  once  t h e  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  go i s  s p e c i f i e d ,  t h e  
f i n a l  Pa re to -op t ima l  p o i n t s  a r e  l i m i t e d .  I n  t h e  c a s e  of n  = 2 
and convex Q o .  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  show by s i m p l e  g e o m e t r i c a l  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n  t h a t  a  p o i n t  4 ~ 6  can  be o b t a i n e d  a s  t h e  l i m i t  of 0  
t h e  compromise-aiding p r o c e d u r e .  i f  
A A 
-0 -0 
- > > q2  - - '5 B and &.> A G l  I\ - -u Sl B 
A 1  B1 - 4, A2 92 - 92 
A A 
where A 2  and A 2  a r e  t h e  w e i g h t i n g  c o e f f i c i e n t s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  
A A 0  A 
> O t A t h e  q .  T h e r e f o r e ,  a s  l o n g  a s  b o t h  G l  - q,  > 0 ,  q 2  - q2  
0  A 1 
c h o i c e  o f  q l ,  q: and B l imits p o s s i b l e  t r a d e - o f f  r a t i o s  - and 
x: A 2 
S i n c e  t h e  main g o a l  of c o n s t r u c t i n g  compromise-aiding pro-  
c e d u r e s  i s  t o  h e l p  d e c i s i o n  makers and n o t  t o  r e p l a c e  them i n  
a c t u a l  d e c i s i o n  making, it i s  u s e f u l  t o  c o n s t r u c t  p rocedures  
based  on t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  more i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  p o s s e s s e d  by 
and p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers .  Suppose t h a t  each  d e c i s i o n  
maker knows t h e  e n t i r e  problem s u f f i c i e n t l y  w e l l  t o  judge upon 
r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  l e v e l s  f o r  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  makers .  Thus, he 
-k t ]  - can  s p e c i f y  an  e n t i r e  v e c t o r  q  - k , j  o f  r e f e r e n c e  
- ( q l  1 .qn 
o b j e c t i v e  l e v e l s  a t  j t h  i t e r a t i o n  of  t h e  p r o c e d u r e ,  i n c l u d i n g  
h i s  own o b j e c t i v e  l e v e l  q  and t h e  o t h e r  o b j e c t i v e  l e v e l s  k  
, i k.  S i n c e  w e  do n o t  assume a n y t h i n g  b u t  t h e  e q u i t y  o f  
d e c i s i o n  makers a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  i t e r a t i v e  pro- 
c e d u r e  can  be c o n s t r u c t e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  
S t e p  1 .  Given n  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  v e c t o r s  c k k . j ,  t h e  c o r -  
r e spond ing  Pare to -op t ima l  p o i n t s  q  n k f j  a r e  o b t a i n e d  by t h e  mini -  
m i z a t i o n  o f  a  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n .  An a v e r a g e  r e f e r e n c e  
n  
o b j e c t i v e  v e c t o r  q j  = z k k ' j  and t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  P a r e t o -  
n  k=l 
o p t i m a l  p o i n t  ~ j  i s  a l s o  d e t e r m i n e d .  A l l  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  
outcomes and t h e  d e c i s i o n s  needed t o  o b t a i n  them i s  p r e s e n t e d  t o  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers .  
S t e p  2. Each d e c i s i o n  maker i s  asked t o  move h i s  r e f e r e n c e  
o b j e c t i v e  v e c t o r  towards  G I ,  a t  l e a s t  f 3 - t i m e s  t h e  e n t i r e  d i s t a n c e :  
where f3 E ( O ; I ]  i s  p r e s p e c i f i e d .  Again,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers can 
e i t h e r  a l l  a g r e e  t o  do s o ,  and t h e n  t h e  i t e r a t i o n s  p roceed ,  o r  
d i s a g r e e ,  which r e s u l t s  i n  a  dead lock .  
I f  no d ead l o ck s  o c c u r ,  it i s  n a t u r a l  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  t h e  
p rocedure  i s  co n v e r g en t .  However, t h e  convergence i s  n o t  s e l f -  
e v i d e n t  and h a s  n o t  been proved y e t .  A convergence proof  f o r  a  
s l i g h t l y  m o d i f i ed  v a r i a n t  o f  t h i s  p rocedure  i s  g i v e n  i n  t h e  
Appendix. 
4 .  COMPROMISE-AIDING PROCEDURES: THE CASE OF MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES 
FOR I N D I V I D U A L  DECISION MAKERS AND OTHER EXTENSIONS 
The p r o ced u r e s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  pa ragraph  c a n  be 
e a s i l y  ex tended  t o  t h e  c a s e  when each  d e c i s i o n  maker h a s  more 
t h a n  one  o b j e c t i v e .  The s i m p l e s t  p rocedure ,  however, can  be u se d  
o n l y  i f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers have s t r i c t l y  d i s j o i n t  o b j e c t i v e s .  
I f  some o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  common f o r  s e v e r a l  d e c i s i o n  makers,  
t h e  s p ace  of  a l l  o b j e c t i v e s  must be c o n s i d e r e d  a s  common f o r  a l l ,  
and t h e  second,  more compl ica ted  p rocedure  can be  a p p l i e d .  
There  a r e  a l s o  c a s e s  of  h i e r a r c h i c a l  d e c i s i o n  making, when 
one or more d e c i s i o n  makers have c e r t a i n  p r e r o g a t i v e s  o v e r  o t h e r s .  
There a r e  many p o s s i b l e  models and p rocedures  t o  r e p r e s e n t  such  
a  s i t u a t i o n .  One o f  them i s  t h e  f o l l owing .  
Suppose a  h i g h e r - l e v e l  d e c i s i o n  maker can i n f l u e n c e  by h i s  
d e c i s i o n s ,  deno ted  y ,  n o t  o n l y  t h e  outcomes, qk = f k ( x l ,  ..., x n , y ) ,  
b u t  a l s o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  makers ,  X O k  = X O k ( y ) .  
The h i g h e r - l e v e l  d e c i s i o n  maker ha s  a l s o  h i s  own o b j e c t i v e ,  
q0  = f o ( x  l , . . . , x n , y ) .  S ince  t h e  mode l -dec i s ions  a r e  made by a n  
o p t i m i z a t i o n  p rocedure ,  he can  be  r e p r e s e n t e d  by h i s  d e s i r a b l e  
- 
l e v e l  of o b j e c t i v e ,  q O ,  o n l y .  However, t o  e x p r e s s  h i s  p r i o r i t i e s ,  
two changes i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  p rocedures  can  be made. F i r s t ,  t h e  
p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  can be modi f i ed  t o  S ( ~ - T )  + 
p o ( G O  - q O ) + ,  where p o  > >  p r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  p r i o r i t y  i n  a t t a i n i n g  
t h e  h i g h e r - l e v e l  o b j e c t i v e  ( t h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a l s o  o r d e r - p r e s e r v i n g  
and o rder -approx imat ing  , see [ 2 4 ]  ) . 
-0 -0 Secondly, he can specify both qo and q0 = (ql,. .. , q ; he is 0 
supposed to attain a compromise on the qo together with other 
decision makers, but not on co, his own objective, which is 
depending on him alone. 
Several other possibilities of compromise-aiding procedures 
in the hierarchical and multiobjective cases are investigated 
by Kallio and Lewandowski, 1979 [12]. An interesting application 
to the planning of possible developments of the Finnish forestry 
industrial sector is also described there. 
5. SPECIAL FORMS OF PENALTY SCALARIZING FUNCTIONS FOR COMPROMISE- 
AIDING PROCEDURES 
It is a known fact in mathematical psychology--see, for 
example, Tversky in [ll--that decision-makers do not take similar 
attitudes to the possibility of not attaining their goals as 
compared to the possibility of exceeding them. In other words, 
- n if 6 - q E R+ and the postulated levels of (minimized) objectives 
$ are not attained, a reasonable procedure should get $ as close 
- 
to q as possible. On the other hand, if $ - q E -R:, the postu- 
lated levels are exceeded, the additional gains should be allo- 
cated between various procedures reasonably fair. The precise 
meaning of this fairness is not of basic importance in the con- 
text of reference objectives q being modified and thus influencing 
4.  However, a certain reasonability and fairness of the allocation 
of gains does help the compromise-aiding procedures in preventing 
unnecessary deadlocks. 
The penalty scalarizing function (I), although it has the 
required property of $ being close to q if - q E R:, does not 
- 
result in a reasonable allocation of gains if $ - q E -R:. This 
is because (see Figure 3a) the function corresponds to the norm 
- 
maximization of gain under the soft constraint q - q E -Rn, 
expressed by the penalty term. 
By adapting the ideas of Nash 1950 [I 61 and Ho 1970 [B] , 
the following penalty scalarizing function has been proposed by 
Majchrzak 1978 [15] : 
- 
based on product of gains, if q - q E -R and on the penalty 
n' 
term with Euclidean norm in the opposite case. It is easy to 
show that this function is order-preserving for any p > 0, 
since both product and norm preserve order for positive components. 
This function is also strictly order-approximating, since So 
- 
= {q E R": s(q - q) - < 0 )  = q - R:. The function is also quasi- 
convex, while the function (1) is quasi-convex only if the sum 
of absolute values norm is used (and convex if, additionally, 
p > 2). The product of gains, as proposed by Ho, expresses some 
degree of fairness of gain allocation (see Figure 3b). 
A differentiable version of the function (9) 
nas, however, inflection points along the entire boundary of 
A more sophisticated concept of the fairness of gain allo- 
cation can be expressed by the following function: 
- 
- min(p min (q - qi)+ , IT (qi - q)+) . 
1 <i<n 
- - t i =  1 
The level sets of this function are given in Figure 3c. The 
function, while being differentiable at the boundary of q - R: 
except at the point q = q, is not differentiable and switches 
n 
- 
from - p  min (qi - qi) + to - r (qi - qi)+ along the set 
1 <i<n i= 1 
n - 
pp = {q E q - R+: p2 min (qi - q. ) = IT (Ti - q. ) 1 , represen- 1 + 1 + 1 <i<n i=l 
n ting the boundary of a cone in < - R+. It has a simple inter- 
pretation in two-dimensional case: while the gain allocation 
2 is guided by the product of gains, at least p -times the larger 
gain is guaranteed for the smaller one. The function is quasi- 
convex, order-preserving (since not only the Euclidean norm and 
the product but also the minimum norm preserve order for positive 
- n 
components) and strictly order-approximating (since So = q - R,). 
Figure 3. Level sets and minimal points in Q of various penalty 0 
scalarizing functions (with the orlgin shifted to q)  : 
a)the function (1); b)the functions ( 9 ) ,  (10) ; c) the 
function (11); d) the function (12). 
Another useful piecewise linear penalty scalarizing function 
is the following: 
It is not quite easy to see that this function is order-preserving. 
n 
- - 
However, observe that the set where 1 (qi - qi) 2 p max (qi - qi), 
i=l 1 <i<n 
- - 
- 
if p > n, is a cone in q - R: and does not have any points in 
- - 
q + R:. Outside of this cone the function is just p max (qi - qi), 
l<i<n 
which is clearly order-preserving. Inside of the cone--see Figure 
3d, where the boundary of the cone is denoted by Po--the function 
corresponds to minus sums of absolute values, which is also 
order-preserving for all negative components. The combination 
of those functions preserves order, too, which is easy though 
tedious to check. 
The function (12) is also strictly order-approximating, 
- n 
since So = q - R+. It is also a convex function. Therefore, 
the minimization of this function can be represented by a linear 
programming problem--provided the set Qo is represented by linear 
inequalities: 
minimize y - 
S = (qll..-l 9,) 'QO i y E Y O ( q  - 4) 
where 
- 
Yo (9 - q) = 
(14) 
1 n 
= {Y R :Y 2 p(cli-Ci) , all i=l,. . . ,n; y 2 1 (qi-qi) } . 
i= 1 
The function (12) represents another concept of a fair allo- 
cation of gains q - Q: just the sum of the gains is important, 
provided that each individual gain is not smaller than l / p  times 
the sum of the gains, see Figure 3c. The minimal part of the 
gain guaranteed for each decision maker must be clearly smaller 
the l/n. 
6. DEADLOCKS AND DEADLOCK-RESOLVING PROCEDURES 
Deadlocks in compromise-reaching can occur for various 
reasons. Two classes of deadlocks are of primary interest here. 
One type of reason for a deadlock might occur if a decision 
maker, while accepting the agreement-aiding procedure as fair, 
feels that his initial demands in terms of reference objective 
levels were modest when compared to other demands, which has 
put him into a disadvantageous situation. This type of deadlock 
is relatively easy to resolve. If all other decision makers 
agree, they can restart the procedure with new reference objec- 
tive levels. If they disagree, they can use a mediator or referee, 
for example, a nigher level decision maker in the hierarchical 
case. 
Another, much more difficult type of deadlock might occur 
if a decision maker preceives that the agreement-aiding proce- 
dure is not fair because it gives equal weight to all decision 
makers, and he could influence the results much more when deciding 
on his own. For simplicity, such a decision maker will be called 
a dissident. The dissident can take two different attitudes: 
either he wants to cooperate further, but he would like more 
weight attached to his demands, he is a cooperative dissident, 
or he refuses to cooperate and wants to make his own decision, 
he is an adversary dissident. Naturally, if a dissident walks 
out of negotiations, no deadlock-resolving procedure can be of 
any use; but we shall consider here the situation where he stays 
in negotiations demanding simply that his decisions xk must be 
made by him, not by the optimization procedure. 
To devise a deadlock-resolving procedure, a gaming model 
of the problem must be constructed: the sequence of decision 
making must be specified, fairly representing the real-world 
situation simulated by the model. For example, depending on 
the real problem, a part of the decisions for the dissident 
decision-maker can be made by him first, then a part of other 
decisions can be specified, etc.; or the dissident must wait 
until other decisions are taken; or decisions can be made simul- 
taneously, but a probable violation of constraints in the model 
must be expressed by a specified payment, a change of objective 
function. All these extentions of the model needed to transform 
it to a gaming model should be specified, presented to the deci- 
sion-makers and agreed upon before the negotiations start; other- 
wise, no deadlock-resolving procedure can be usefully constructed. 
If a gaming model of the problem is available and consistent 
with the optimization model, various types of dissident-deadlocks 
can be resolved. If the dissident is cooperative, he might be 
allowed to make his own decisions and introduce into the gaming 
model, while the optimization procedure represents the other 
decision-makers by not playing against the dissident but trying 
to keep the other objectives close to the last agreed average 
reference levels. The dissident decisions are then either taken 
as fixed, if he moves first, or predicted by an optimization 
procedure, if he moves last. The obtained level of the dissi- 
dent's objective is then considered as a fixed reference level, 
similarly as in the case of a higher level decision maker, and 
used in a repetition of the optimization procedure in order to 
bring the results to the Pareto set. Thus, a cooperative.dissident 
must agree that his decisions will be modified, while his attained 
objective level is guaranteed; if he does not agree, he puts 
himself in the adversary category. 
If the dissident is adversary, another optimization proce- 
dure can be devised to play against him, just.to show how much 
he can loose by putting himself into an adversary situation. 
Clearly, results of such a gaming exercise have only psychological 
value, since other objectives have to be sacrificed during this 
gaming. But the reason of this gaming is to convince the dissi- 
dent that he should rather agree on cooperation--or to reveal 
that the problem is essentially of adversary nature. 
7. .POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of the paper was rather to show the possibilities 
of constructing pragmatical compromise-aiding procedures based 
on reference objective levels than to develop fully the related 
theory. Much can be done in this direction. Various compromise- 
aiding procedures must be checked against practical applications, 
convergence of these procedures analyzed, special deadlock- 
resolving procedures developed. 
The only point stressed here is that penalty scalarizing 
functions based on reference objective levels are, on one hand, 
deeply related to the basic theory of multiobjective optimization 
and result, on the other had, in a pragmatical approach to group 
multiobjective decision making. Many forms of the objectives, 
even in terms of desired dynamic trajectories or desired proba- 
bility distributions can be also considered by this approach [ 2 5 ] .  
APPENDIX: CONVERGENCE OF A MODIFIED COMPROMISE-AIDING 
PROCEDURE 
C o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m o d i f i e d  compromise -a id ing  p r o c e d u r e :  
S t e p  1 .  Given n  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  v e c t o r s  q k f J ,  cofre- 
s p o n d i n g  P a r e t o - o p t i m a l  p o i n t s  $ a r e  o b t a i n e d  by t h e  min imi-  
z a t i o n  o f  a  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  s(9-q).  An a v e r a g e  
n  
o b j e c t i v e  v e c t o r  qJ = J a n d  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  P a r e t o -  
n  k= 1  
o p t i m a l  p o i n t  $ j  i s  a l s o  d e t e r m i n e d .  A l l  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  
ou tcomes  and  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  needed  t o  o b t a i n  them i s  p r e s e n t e d  
t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  make r s .  
S t e p  2 .  I f  s ($I - q J )  < 0, t h e n  new r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t s  a r e  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  by 
where E ( 0 ; l )  i s  a  g i v e n  p a r a m e t e r .  S e t  j + j + l  and r e p e a t  
S t e p  1 .  
S t e p  3 .  I f  j > 1 ,  t h e n  c o n d i t i o n  1 J - J < 
- 
( 1 )  1 J - J '  1 i s  checked .  I f  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  d o e s  n o t  h o l d ,  
t h e n  qj  i s  r ~ o d i f i e d  by: 
and a modified corresponding Pareto-optimal point 4iew is also 
determined. The additional information is presented to the 
decision makers. 
Step 4. Each decision-maker is asked to move his reference 
objective vector towards 4' (adew if the modification is Step 3 
was performed), at least B-times the entire distance: 
If all decision makers agree to do so, then j + j+l is set and 
Step 1 is repeated. If some of them disagree, a deadlock occurs. 
If all agree to use B = 1, then the procedure stops. 
The additional Step 2 changes automatically reference levels 
and the average objective vector to obtain qJfl $ Q0 + R: (see 
Figure Al). Since all objective levels are improved by this 
change, the decision makers are only 'informed and not asked to 
agree; they can, however, disagree in nest iteration. It is easy 
to check that Step 3 can be omitted if Step 2 has been performed 
just before, since the condition required by Step 3 is then 
automatically satisfied. 
Figure Al. Interpretation of the reference level change performed 
in Step 2. 
I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t o  show t h a t  i f  Q o  i s  convex and  G O  
compact ,  w h a t e v e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  cklo, t h e n  S t e p  2 c a n  b e  pe r fo rmed  
o n l y  a  f i n i t e  number o f  t i m e s  t o  o b t a i n  $ Q O  + R: f o r  a l l  
s u b s e q u e n t  i t e r a t i o n s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  c o n v e r g e n c e  a n a l y s i s  o f  
t h e  p r o c e d u r e  c a n  b e  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  c a s e  q' Q O  + Rn.  
Lemma Al .  I f  t h e  s e t  Qo i s  convex and  8 i s  compact ,  and i f  0  
no d e a d l o c k s  o c c u r ,  t h e n  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  d e s c r i b e d  above  i s  conve r -  
g e n t  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  $w = l i m  $I and  a l s o  
- j  P r o o f .  S i n c e  $ j  m i n i m i z e s  s ( q  - q  ) and t h u s  a l s o  t h e  
h 
d i s t a n c e  f o r  q j  t o  Q O ,  i f  qJ $ Go + R" hence  +' 
where t h e  l a s t  i n e q u a l i t y  r e s u l t s  from S t e p  2 ( t h i s  i n e q u a l i t y  
c o u l d  a l s o  b e  p r o v e n , n o t  f o r c e d  a l g o r i t h m i c a l l y ,  b u t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
j  -I - a s s u m p t i o n s  a r e  much s t r o n g e r  i n  t h i s  c a s e ) .  Hence, l i m  I (  $ -q (1-0; 
j + w  j -1  - 1 i m I I $  - = O .  However, ] I $ J  - Q ~ - l  
j +w 
+ 1 1  4 -  - qJll ; h e n c e  a l s o  l i m l  q J - j 1  = 0.  s i n c e  { $ j l ~ = ~  j+w 
c G O  i s  compact ,  it h a s  a c c u m u l a t i o n  p o i n t s ;  t h e y  c a n n o t  b e  
d i s t i n c t ,  s i n c e  t h e n  l i r n ( 1  $ j  - 4'-I  1 1  would n o t  e x i s t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
I =" 
j  t h e r e  i s  a  u n i q u e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  p o i n t  $w = l i m  $ . C l e a r l y ,  
j  +w 
l i m  = $w. 
j + w  
- +  - $ 1  5 (1  - B )  1 1  p E q u a t i o n s  (A3) imply  a l s o  1 )  q  k l ~ - $ j l l ,  
which c a n  b e  r e w r i t t e n  a s  ( 1  k ' l -  q < ( 1 - R )  1 1  - k r j  q - 4 w l l  
-
- $ w I I  w e r e  n o t  c o n v e r g e n t  t o  + 2 - 1 $1 - $ I  - If  / /  q 
z e r o ,  t h e n  f o r  a r b i t r a r i l y  s m a l l  E > 0,  E < 6 ,  t h e r e  would b e  
- k , j + l - Q w l l  a r b i t r a r i l y  l d r g e  j  s u c h  t h a t  ( 1 ; )  1 - 5 / I  q  
would h o l d ;  b u t  t h i s  would i m p l y  
0 ( L c  - E )  1 1  q k t J  - ij / I  5 ( 2  - 13) 1 1  $ j  - amlJ c o n v e r g i n g  t o  z e r o ,  a 
cm 
- - 1 ,  = ,. c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  Hence l i m  1 1  q 
j +cn 
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